Zelensky’s projection of himself as a president for peace echoes the deep yearning of a big majority of Ukrainians for an end to the war in Donbas. He seems willing to make concessions, such as a measure of regional autonomy, a say in the foreign and security policies, the use of Russian language and so on. If he moves in that direction, a sea change in the climate of relations between Ukraine and Russia is possible.
The elite attempting to control the world under an “end of history” neo-liberal doctrine have created a mountain of unresolvable paradoxes for themselves in Ukraine since unleashing the anti-Russian Euromaidan color revolution in late 2013 that unseated a pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych government, and replaced it with a Nazi-infested technocratic regime which has […]
In the post-Soviet period, US foreign policy and media establishments have overhyped Ukrainian positives, while disproportionately highlighting the negatives in Russia and Belarus. Let’s see if Zelensky will break from that trend. For now, it’s quite premature to see him and his country as a positive model for Russia and Belarus.
Simply put, Zelensky needs to be ‘pro-Ukraine’ than ‘pro-West’ — that is to say, he should realise that if Ukraine has any chance of prospering, it must somehow normalise relations with Moscow, which remains its largest trading partner.But will he be allowed by the West to open a dialogue with Moscow?
The stage in Ukraine has been going to seed for some years, manuring away in decay and poverty, bleeding in the Donbass region and plundered by self-enriching elites. It took Zelenskiy to come to the fore by stepping off the screen and, quite literally, onto a live stage. Whether he is capable of directing his own show, mastering his own brief, as it were, will be a wonder.
Provoking conflicts in the Orthodox world has become a new area of US intervention in the internal affairs of other states, and the geographical spread of their activities is expanding rapidly. Besides Ukraine itself, the Ukrainian schism will directly affect Russia, Turkey, and Greece. Attempts to fuel dissension are currently being observed in the Balkans.
What are the options available with Paris and Berlin over Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia? The faultlines in their relations with Trump seriously weaken their capacity to cope with Russian resurgence.
As the UN Security Council discussed Kosovo, the UN General Assembly voted in favor of a non-binding pro-Kiev regime resolution on the Azov Sea. Notwithstanding, most of the UN member states didn’t vote for that resolution, with numerous abstentions and some no shows.
There’s no such thing as the so-called “Crimean Corridor”, but it plays to Poroshenko’s domestic political interests to pretend that there is, and if he’s even partially successful at manipulating international perceptions surrounding this fake news narrative.
Of course, an open western military intervention can be ruled out. But the danger lies in the Ukrainian hardliners drawing encouragement from the Western support to stage more provocations against Russia that might lead to a conflict. A flare-up in Donbass between the Ukrainian army and the separatists (backed by Russia) also cannot be ruled out.
If Kiev continues its anti-Russian and pro-NATO/USA/EU’s political-military course, the joint republic of Luhansk and Donetsk regions (or more) will be declared as an independent state with a real possibility to join the Russian Federation as Crimea already did it in 2014.
The head of the Hungarian foreign minister’s security team has been informed of Mr. Szijjártó’s inclusion on the list on the Ukrainian extremist website, and the required measures had been taken. Have the Ukrainian state-related institutions become a death threat for the European officials?