The Hypocrisy Of Alt-Media’s Arguments In Favor Of Armenia
The Alt-Media Community is in the midst of a heated debate over whether to support Armenia or Azerbaijan in their latest clashes with one another over Nagorno-Karabakh. The general sentiment is strongly in support of the former, though mostly for the purpose of signaling support for a Christian state that’s at odds with a Turkish ally, especially considering how reviled Turkey and its President are in the community for their role in trying to overthrow the Syrian government that so many of them sympathize with. This approach has led to many of Armenia’s supporters ignoring the same international law that many of them routinely rely upon for making arguments in favor of Palestine, Serbia, Syria, and Yemen. It’s possible to have double or even triple standards since the world is much too complex for the UN’s imperfectly implemented single standards to be the benchmark every single time, though such a stance must be publicly articulated in a coherent manner in order for those espousing it to retain their credibility. That regrettably hasn’t happened, though, which is problematic.
The author’s analysis of this conflict is the complete opposite of that since it’s been articulated to the best of his ability this entire time and is extremely transparent with its intent to explain the international legal basis which justifies Azerbaijan’s ongoing counteroffensive. For those who aren’t aware of his earlier work on this topic, here’s a list of his relevant articles to review if they’re interested in learning more about his views. Those who have mutual friends with him on Facebook are also invited to respectfully discuss them on his page. His account restricts those who can comment in order to prevent trolls from derailing the conversation as well as make it less likely that mass troll reporting attacks would trigger the algorithm into suspending his page like Indian ones have done before (since it’s suspected that the algorithm reacts differently depending on account settings):
* 27 September: “Azerbaijan’s Counteroffensive Is Legal But Might Inadvertently Spiral Out Of Control”
* 28 September: “Debunking The Top Five Fake News Narratives About Nagorno-Karabakh”
* 29 September: “Azerbaijan Has The Legal Right To Request Turkish Military Assistance In Nagorno-Karabakh”
* 30 September: “Russian Strategic Calculations In The Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis”
* 30 September: “Armenia & Its Supporters’ Insincere Narrative Stance Spoils A Unique Opportunity”
* 30 September: “What’s The Difference Between Nagorno-Karabakh & Kashmir?”
* 1 October: “Iranian Geostrategic Calculations In The Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis”
It’s everyone’s right whether to agree or disagree with the legal, moral, and normative bases upon which the author argues in support of Azerbaijan’s counteroffensive, but another important angle that should be discussed is Russian interests in the outcome. This piece argues that there are five reasons why an Azerbaijani victory over Armenia would serve Russian interests. The author also challenges prominent pro-Armenian influencers in the Alt-Media Community to respond to each one for the purpose of enriching the literature on this topic and aiding the general audience in arriving at their own conclusions. Having explained the well-intended motivation behind this article, it’s now time to describe the five ways in which an Azerbaijani victory would benefit Russia.
1. Teach The Soros Color Revolution Government In Armenia A Lesson
Armenia’s post-Color Revolution government is controlled by the Soros network. Stalker Zone published a detailed report about this in August 2019 titled “Soros Foundation In Armenia: Independent Study Of The Country’s System Of External Governance”, and Azerbaijani President Aliyev recently referenced this shadowy state of affairs in an interview with his country’s media and then shortly after with Russia’s Rossiya-1 TV channel too. Over the past two and a half years, Armenia has accelerated its preexisting westward drift and attempted (though largely unsuccessfully) to “decouple” itself from Russia. Cynically speaking, an Azerbaijani victory over Armenia would teach the latter’s Soros Color Revolution government a lesson about the futility of trying to “decouple” the country from Russia. Without Russian military support, nothing would prevent Turkey from launching a land invasion and all that might entail. The Armenian state might not survive without Russia.
2. Secure Crucial Trans-Azerbaijani Trade Corridors
Azerbaijan is a fulcrum of the emerging Multipolar World Order because it sits at the crossroads of both Russia’s North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC) with Iran and India as well as the Chinese-Turkish Middle Corridor through the South Caucasus, Caspian Sea, and Central Asia. These transnational connective infrastructure projects can never be fully secure until the formerly frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is settled once and for all in line with the four UNSC Resolutions (822, 853, 874, 884) on the matter demanding the Armenian military’s withdrawal from universally recognized Azerbaijani territory. After all, Armenia can always hold the Damocles’ sword of striking those projects as an asymmetric response to any Azerbaijani gains in the occupied regions. Russia, Iran, India, China, the Central Asian Republics, and Turkey therefore cannot remain confident in the long-term viability of these trade corridors until a formal peace prevails in the South Caucasus.
3. Remain Consistent With Russia’s Approach To Palestine & Serbia
Russia’s international legal approach to the conflicts in Palestine and Serbia would be undermined if it ignored the same UNSC Resolutions on Azerbaijan that it voted for on four separate occasions. Moscow acknowledges that the parties to each dispute can reach an understanding with one another to settle their problems outside the framework established by the UN if they so choose, but that possibility is unrealistic when it comes to Nagorno-Karabakh. It’s perhaps also for this reason why Russia has armed Azerbaijan to the teeth so as to facilitate the possibility of its forceful implementation of those four UNSC Resolutions. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that Azerbaijani arms imports surged 249% between 2005-2009 and 2010-2014, during which time Russia accounted for a whopping 85% of that country’s total purchases, and Russia also provided for 51% of Azerbaijani arms from 2014-2018, remaining its top supplier.
4. Thwart The Uncontrollable “Balkanization” Of The Region
An Armenian victory could spark the uncontrollable “Balkanization” of the region by possibly prompting a return to ethno-separatism there. This could rekindle the Chechen conflict in Russia’s North Caucasus as well as provoke a similar one in northwestern Iran among its massive Azeri minority there. Attempting to violently redraw international borders on the basis of identity is the embodiment of Ralph Peters’ infamous “Blood Borders” proposal for dividing and ruling the so-called “Greater Middle East”. It could therefore set off a chain reaction in this very identity-diverse region which might spread the flames of conflict further afield through what Brzezinski described as the “Eurasian Balkans” in his self-explanatory 1997 book about “The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives”. All regional stakeholders apart from Armenia have every reason to oppose this dangerous scenario which could offset the Multipolar World Order.
5. Promote Polyconfessional & Multiethnic Azerbaijan As An “Anti-Balkanization” Model
“Balkanization” will remain an enduring threat to the identity-diverse Eastern Hemisphere so long as the modern-day system of International Relations remains in place. Instead of submitting to this potentially uncontrollable chain reaction for dividing and ruling cosmopolitan states on the basis of identity (all to the benefit of American grand strategic designs), the solution is to promote polyconfessional and multiethnic states as the structural antidote to this scenario. Azerbaijan can serve as an “anti-Balkanization” model for Afro-Eurasia if it fully regains control of its internationally recognized territory since it has a post-Soviet history of peacefully incorporating its Russian Christian minority. The dark period of ethnic unrest from the late Soviet period is long gone and modern-day Azerbaijan proudly proved its commitment to inter-identity harmony.
Taking into account the author’s five primary arguments, Russian interests are best served by an Azerbaijani victory over Armenia. Moscow wants to teach Yerevan’s Soros Color Revolution government a lesson, secure crucial trans-Azerbaijani trade corridors, remain consistent in its approach to Palestine and Serbia, thwart the uncontrollable “Balkanization” of the region, and promote polyconfessional and multiethnic Azerbaijan as an “anti-Balkanization” model for Afro-Eurasia. By contrast, Armenia’s victory over Azerbaijan would also be a victory for Yerevan’s Soros Color Revolution government, jeopardize multipolar transnational connective infrastructure projects, undermine international legal arguments in favor of Palestine and Serbia, catalyze regional “Balkanization” processes, and lessen the appeal of polyconfessional and multiethnic state solutions to identity conflicts. The author is now eagerly awaiting the publication of pro-Armenian counterarguments.