Iran has survived over 40 years of the multifaceted and ever-evolving Hybrid War being waged against it, while Iraq miraculously overcame its fierce identity tensions to remain a unified state, and they can each complement one another’s stabilization measures by comprehensively expanding their ties with one another.
Trump provocatively pledged to keep US troops in Iraq. The President said in a recent interview with CBS that “…I want to be able to watch Iran. All I want to do is be able to watch. We have an unbelievable and expensive military base built in Iraq. It’s perfectly […]
Iraq is in the midst of a worsening multisided domestic crisis that contradicts “conventional” thinking about the country’s most well-known fault lines, and it’s very possible that it might become the “next Syria” if its many problems aren’t properly resolved soon enough.
Iraq has intimate socio-economic and energy links with Iran that are impossible to sever without dealing disastrous damage to the country, though the US is nevertheless trying to pressure it into complying with its sanctions against the Islamic Republic.
IS/Daesh’s drone achievements have important implications for future drone use & hybridized threats, as the group’s drone feats could serves as a model or inspiration for other terrorists and/or nation-states and proxy groups that are developing their own hybrid warfare strategies.
The “rolling back” of Iran’s “strategic depth” in the Levant will make Iraq an even greater priority for it, especially after al-Sadr’s victory and his consequent “balancing” of the Islamic Republic and the Wahhabi Kingdom that his country’s wedged between.
Since Iraq, one if the Arab world’s most developed countries, was laid waste by US bombing, and since the war was deemed a big mistake, who is responsible for trying to repair Iraq to its pre-war condition?
If a “regime change” does indeed take place in Iraqi Kurdistan, whether by electoral or militant means, then it might throw all Barzani-era international contracts into question.
The renewed diplomatic offensive that’s being waged against Iran’s regional interests might have a majorly unintended effect in strengthening Tehran’s political will to support its allied militias abroad.
Iraq has most likely coordinated its response with its Turkish and Iranian neighbors, both of whom are confronting their own armed Kurdish separatists as well.
Moscow steadily works to replace the leadership void that the US is leaving in the “Greater Middle East”.
Iran and Saudi Arabia must find a temporary compromise in their Mideast-wide rivalry and cooperate in keeping Iraq together as the most visibly tangible sign of any forthcoming détente.